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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Of the two issues included in Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court 
accepted jurisdiction over a single issue for certiorari review -:u
 f uiei , a , on 
August 20, 2010 ("August • ' < 102(3)(a) 
.»:•«! Rulo M^a; of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (A copy of the August 
26 Order is attached in the Addendum at Tab A.) 
TT
 QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: \Vh» ffin Ihr rouil of .ippeals erred in affirming the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the issue of Respondents' liability under the alter ego doctrine. 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a case on cenu IM 
rcview|s| IIKM'WUII ol .ippculs" KVINIOII lot ^ono'lucss," Ionising "on whether [the court 
of appeals] correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review." Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 I IT 10, | 8 , 152 P. Id Ml (further quotation arid 
citation omitted, second tilU'Mliiui m inij'iii.i! I SHUHII n s Midi infill i> -ippi«»|>iink where 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law," I Jtah R. Civ, Pro. 56(c) "[W]hen an appellate court 
reviews a district court > gMiil ml Minnihin n nip tun ml, (In liuls ,md .ill iiicasotiable 
inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.'" Massey, 2007 IJT 10 at f 8 (further citation omitted), " \ trial court's decision not 
'to pierce the corporate veil will be uphek . * • ' • • • ; 
judgincnl ,n .7'/<'//,/ i' Hire Dev., Inc., 2006 U I App 416, 121, 147 P.3d 515 (quoting 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
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i n . CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCES 
As recognized by Petitioner Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. ("J&T Marketing" or 
"Petitioner"), there are no constitutional or statutory provisions material to this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by J&T Marketing on August 29, 2002. 
[R. 49.] The original complaint named Financial Development Services, Inc. ("FDS"), 
Jeremy Warburton ("Warburton"), and John Neubauer ("Neubauer") as defendants and 
contained six causes of action. [R. 39-49.] All of J&T Marketing's claims against the 
defendants arose out of, or were related to, a Sales and Marketing Agreement 
("Agreement") entered into between FDS and J&T Marketing in February, 2002. [R. 33-
37.] (A copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B.) Petitioner 
acknowledges that "[t]his case generally revolves around a contract dispute." Brief of 
Petitioner at 3. 
On May 6, 2004, the district court granted J&T Marketing leave to amend its 
complaint and allege claims against FDS, Warburton, Neubauer, Jonathan L. Lowry 
("Lowry"), Nathan Kinsella ("Kinsella"), and Esbex.com, Inc. ("Esbex.com") [R. 994-
996.] J&T Marketing filed its Amended Complaint on June 18, 2004, alleging nine 
causes of action: breach of contract, theft by conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, accounting, injunctive relief, constructive 
fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure, and intentional interference with business relations. [R. 
1027-44.] Five of these causes of action contained tort claim allegations individually 
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against Lowry, Kinsella (collectively "Respondents") and others, including FDS. [See id.] 
Three of the causes of action (breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, 
and accounting) were brought solely against FDS. [See id.] A claim based upon alter ego 
was not mentioned or pleaded in the Amended Complaint. [See id.] 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
On May 20, 2005, Respondents Lowry and Kinsella filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, seeking dismissal of J&T Marketing's second, third, seventh, eighth, and ninth 
causes of action as they applied to Lowry and Kinsella, i.e., all of the causes of action 
that alleged tort claims against them.1 [R. 1198-1200.] In opposing Respondents' motion, 
J&T Marketing relied heavily upon a deposition of John Neubauer that had been taken in 
Neubauer's separate bankruptcy proceeding. [R. 1292-1322.] Respondents had not been 
parties in that proceeding and had not participated in the deposition. Accordingly, 
Respondents Lowry and Kinsella objected to J&T Marketing's use of Neubauer's 
bankruptcy deposition and moved to strike it. [R. 1570-1571.] A hearing was held, and 
the district court granted Respondents' motion to strike Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition, but it allowed J&T Marketing additional time to conduct a new deposition of 
Neubauer in the instant case. [R. 1629.] The district court ordered that after participating 
in this new deposition, supplemental memoranda could be filed by each party. [R. 1629, 
1
 J&T Marketing's first, fourth, and fifth causes of action were brought only against FDS. 
[R. 1034-35, 1031-32.] J&T Marketing's sixth cause of action for injunctive relief was 
brought against Lowry, Kinsella, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com. [R. 1030-31.] 
J&T Marketing did not appeal the trial court's decision to strike Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition. 
4852-0376-0135 / LO001.004 3 
1635-37.] 
J&T Marketing took Neubauer's deposition on October 18, 2005, and both parties 
thereafter filed supplemental briefs. [R. 1651-59; 1672-83.] Following oral argument, the 
district court issued its Ruling Granting In Part Defendants Lowry and Kinsella's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, on February 1, 2006 (a copy of this ruling is included in the 
Addendum hereto at Tab C). The district court granted complete summary judgment to 
Respondents Lowry and Kinsella on the second, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of 
action of the Amended Complaint. [R. 1691-97.] With respect to J&T Marketing's third 
cause of action claiming fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the district court granted 
complete summary judgment as to Kinsella but not as to Lowry. In declining to grant 
Lowry judgment on this cause of action, the district court concluded there was an issue 
concerning "Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract 'FDS would 
cease selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads.'" The district 
court explained that "[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the 
Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim." [R. 
1692 (emphasis added).] The ruling granting summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella 
except as to this limited claim against Lowry was later summarized in the district court's 
Order on Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on 
March 21, 2006 ("2006 Order") (a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at 
TabD). [R.202L] 
Following the entry of the 2006 Order, J&T Marketing took no immediate action 
to pursue the lingering claim against Lowry. Instead, J&T Marketing sought and obtained 
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a default judgment against FDS and Esbex.com on September 13, 2007. [R. 2215-17.] 
The September 13, 2007 default judgment did not address J&T Marketing's remaining 
claim against Lowry for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
With no final disposition of the lingering claim against Lowry, J&T Marketing 
filed a Notice of Appeal on October 5, 2008, seeking review of the district court's 2006 
Order. [R. 2225.] Because no final disposition had been made as to all claims and parties, 
Respondents argued that the matter was not ripe for appeal. As a result, J&T Marketing 
voluntarily dismissed its appeal, [R. 2246], and the matter was remitted to the district 
court, [R. 2251.] On June 23, 2008, Lowry filed a summary judgment motion with the 
district court focusing on J&T Marketing's remaining fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
[R. 2272-85.] Exercising its discretion to re-examine the fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim as provided in Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court 
granted summary judgment to Lowry on October 8, 2008, holding that there was no 
evidence that Lowry made the alleged statement that FDS would "cease using Thomas's' 
name and leads" and that any related statements made by Lowry were not statements of a 
"currently existing material fact." [R. 2380-83.] (A copy of the Order Granting 
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("2008 Order") is 
included in the Addendum hereto at Tab E). J&T Marketing appealed the 2006 Order and 
the 2008 Order on October 16, 2008 to the Utah Supreme Court. [R. 2403.] On 
November 3, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred J&T Marketing's appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
After briefing and oral argument, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
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district court to grant summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella, concluding that the 
Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that there were any material facts in dispute. Jones & 
Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2010 UT App 113, f l8 , 233 P.3d 538. (A copy of this 
Opinion is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab F.) In ruling that Petitioner had not 
shown the necessary elements of an alter ego claim, the court of appeals determined that 
"the evidence presented to the district court and called to [the court of appeals'] attention 
on appeal, viewed in the light most favorable to [Petitioner], does not support the 
contention that the money was taken 'without proper accounting."5 Id. at Tf9. On the 
contrary, the court of appeals concluded that the undisputed record established that "the 
money was accounted for, and no evidence was produced that this accounting was done 
improperly." Id. 
In addition, the court of appeals stated that even if it were to "uncritically" accept 
Petitioner's accusations "that the money taken was improperly accounted for or wrongly 
distributed and used for purely personal purposes," it did not agree that this fact standing 
alone was sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id. at f 10. "Without any evidence of 
the other alter ego factors, [the court of appeals could not] gauge the materiality of the 
one factor on which evidence was presented." Id. Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence "to show a material dispute of fact relative 
to whether Lowry and Kinsella were alter egos of FDS or Esbex." Id. 
Second, the court of appeals addressed Petitioner's allegation that Respondents 
were personally liable for damages arising from their acts as corporate officers because of 
their participation in wrongful activity. Id. at f l l . The court of appeals held that 
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Petitioner's evidence concerning its claims that Lowry or Kinsella should be held 
personally liable for tortious conduct was not adequately supported by the record "or, 
even if viewed in the light most favorable to [Petitioner], was misstated." Id. at f 15. 
Petitioner did not petition this Court to review the court of appeals' decision to grant 
summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella's on any of J&T Marketing's tort claims. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts3 
J&T Marketing's claims arise out of performance under a contract between FDS 
and J&T Marketing entered into in February 2002, which allowed FDS to sell J&T 
Marketing's Ted Thomas Courses. [R. 33-37, 1320.] Pursuant to the contract, J&T 
Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of sales leads, 
and FDS marketed and sold the courses and remitted to J&T Marketing a portion of the 
sales proceeds. [R. 1320.] The contract provided that FDS could also enroll purchasers of 
the Ted Thomas Courses in FDS's own program to provide coaching services on its own 
account. [R. at 1320, 1701.] Approximately five and a half months after entering into the 
contract, i.e.9 on July 19, 2002, FDS cancelled the contract and informed J&T Marketing 
J&T Marketing's citations to the record in the Brief of Petitioner do not support its 
factual allegations. Indeed, some of the citations actually refer to J&T Marketing's 
argument section of its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry 
and Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1293-1308.] Other citations 
refer to Neubauer's October 18, 2005 deposition, portions of which were attached to J&T 
Marketing's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry 
and Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1640-49.] However, the pages 
of the record cited to do not contain evidence supporting J&T Marketing's factual 
statements. This Court has repeatedly held that "this court need not, and will not consider 
any facts not property cited to, or supported by, the record." Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 
UT 32, f20, 232 P.3d 486 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, f21, 104 
P.3d 1208)). 
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that J&T Marketing was in breach of contract based upon its failure to deliver the Ted 
Thomas Courses to customers after FDS had made sales. [R. 1316, 1598, 1699.] In 
reaction to FDS's cancellation of the Agreement, J&T Marketing filed its original 
complaint against FDS and others on August 29, 2002. [R. 1316, 1699.] 
The putative reasons that J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its 
Ted Thomas Courses to customers included the following: J&T Marketing would delay 
shipment of product to purchaser if FDS's payment was delayed; J&T Marketing 
employed temporary shipping clerks to do product shipment, which resulted in staff 
turnover and ongoing training and supervision issues; and J&T Marketing finally ceased 
shipping Ted Thomas Courses altogether due to a contract dispute with FDS over 
payment issues. [R. 1317, 1699-1700.] 
A third entity, Esbex.com, was affiliated with FDS. While not providing Ted 
Thomas Courses, it provided coaching/mentoring services for a monthly fee to some 
purchasers of the Ted Thomas Courses. [R. 1319, 1701.] One of the payment issues that 
arose was whether a percentage of the coaching fees charged for coaching/mentoring 
services provided by Esbex.com was owed to J&T Marketing; FDS and Esbex.com did 
not believe that coaching services were included under the Agreement. [R. 1698.] When 
J&T Marketing failed to ship product to FDS, FDS filled some orders by shipping 
products that had been returned by other clients because it was trying to keep customers 
and prevent more refunds or cancellations. [R. 1647, Deposition of John Neubauer (dated 
October 18, 2005) ("Neubauer Dep.") 16:4-14.] While J&T Marketing asserts that FDS 
and Esbex.com should have split coaching fees under the Agreement, the only evidence 
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presented to the district court was that the coaching fees were not covered by the contract 
and, therefore there was no obligation to share them with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644, 
Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.] 
Lowry and Kinsella were shareholders, officers and directors of FDS and 
Esbex.com. [R. 1318, 1700.] Neubauer was the Chief Operating Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer of FDS, and both FDS and Esbex.com used Neubauer to perform their 
accounting. [R. 1598, 1701.] Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T 
Marketing, and all communication with J&T Marketing went through Neubauer. [R. 
1318-19, 1700-01.] In his deposition taken in this case on October 18, 2005, Neubauer 
testified that FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate companies, stating that he "wouldn't 
have worked there if [he] didn't feel that way." [R. 1640, Neubauer Dep. 42:4-11.] 
Neubauer also testified that Lowry and Kinsella received money from the business, and 
as chief financial officer he accounted for and kept track of such withdrawals. [R. 1641, 
Neubauer Dep. 40:3-14.] Indeed, Neubauer audited the records himself and prepared 
weekly conciliation reports. [R. 1643, Neubauer Dep. 29:13-21.] 
The undisputed evidence in the record establishes only that FDS and Esbex.com 
followed corporate formalities. [R. 1196.] No evidence presented to the district court 
shows that Lowry or Kinsella co-mingled funds or acted outside of the scope of their 
corporate responsibilities at any time relevant to this matter. In November 2004, almost 
three years after entering into the Agreement, and just under two years after J&T 
Marketing filed its original complaint, FDS and Esbex.com were dissolved. [R. 1698.] 
Lowry presented uncontroverted evidence to the district court that he had given 
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instructions not to sell Ted Thomas products, and that he never rescinded this instruction. 
[R 2286, 2289-91, 2292, 2308, 2381.] Incontroverted evidence was presented that 
Lowry did not authorize any transaction involving the sale of a Ted Thomas product or 
any sales contact with a Ted Thomas lead after July 19, 2002. [R. 2307.] No evidence 
was submitted by J&T Marketing to demonstrate that that Lowry or Kinsella individually 
hid evidence of sales of Ted Thomas products after July 19, 2002. [R. 2381.] 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner J&T Marketing originally brought mainly contract claims against FDS 
in this lawsuit. [R. at 40-44.] After conducting discovery which included taking may 
depositions, J&T Marketing amended its complaint, continuing to allege contract claims 
but also including tort claims against officers and employees of FDS. J&T Marketing 
later sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold Lowry and Kinsella liable for damages in 
the place of FDS. Lowry and Kinsella submitted that piercing the corporate veil is an 
equitable doctrine that courts should be extraordinarily reluctant to impose in contract 
cases. Despite a record that demonstrates a considerable volume of discovery having 
been conducted, J&T Marketing has utterly failed to present any evidence to justify 
piercing the corporate veil under the alter ego test. The evidence in the record fails to 
raise an issue of material fact regarding whether a unity of interest existed between 
Respondents and FDS and/or Esbex.com. Instead, the undisputed record evidence 
demonstrates that corporate formalities were followed and that corporate finances were 
properly accounted for by FDS. In addition, no evidence in the record indicates that 
Lowry or Kinsella acted outside of the scope of their positions within the corporations. 
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Without any evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil under the alter ego doctrine, 
the court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on J&T Marketing's claims. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Affirmed the District Court's Grant of 
Summary Judgment in Favor of Lowry and Kinsella on J&T Marketing's 
Alter Ego Claims Because No Genuine Issues of Material Fact were 
Established. 
"When reviewing a case on certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness," focusing "on whether [the court of appeals] correctly reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Massey v. Griffiths, 
2007 UT 10, f8, 152 P.3d 312 (further quotation and citation omitted). Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment may be obtained "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). 
However, when contending against a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff having 
the burden of proof "has the obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show 
that [it is] entitled to proceed to trial." Gerbich v. Numedlnc, 1999 UT 37, ^ [12, 977 P.2d 
1205. This is particularly true "when the parties [have] had an opportunity to conduct 
discovery." Id. Evidence is sufficient when it raises "a genuine issue of fact." Klienert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also Utah R. Civ. 
Pro. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
4852-0376-0135 / LO00L004 11 
[Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial/'). If the plaintiff as the 
non-moving party does not submit any evidence to support an element of its claim, the 
district court should grant summary judgment on that claim. 
Utah court decisions on this standard are consistent with United States Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the federal equivalent of Utah's Rule 56. 
When a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to that party's case . . . there can be 'no genuine 
issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning 
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial." Thus, the standard for summary judgment "mirrors 
the standard for a directed verdict," in that a moving party, who has 
otherwise made its case, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where 
the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an 
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of 
proof." 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (internal citations omitted)). Since 
J&T Marketing did not set forth facts sufficient to raise a dispute over the existence of 
any material fact supporting the essential elements of an alter ego claim against Lowry 
and Kinsella, the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and properly granted summary judgment against J&T Marketing on this 
issue. See Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 23, 116 P.3d 323. 
B. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on J&T 
Marketing's Alter Ego Claims. 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
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judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on J&T Marketing's alter ego theory because J&T 
Marketing failed to establish any material facts relevant to the alter ego factors, making 
summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law.4 
L Courts Should be Extraordinarily Reluctant Lift the Corporate Veil 
in Contract Disputes. 
Each of J&T Marketing's claims in the Amended Complaint specifically identifies 
FDS as a defendant. J&T Marketing's first, fourth, and fifth claims for relief (breach of 
contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting) are directly related to the 
contract dispute. J&T Marketing's remaining claims against FDS also boil down to the 
contract dispute between J&T Marketing and FDS. 
In Utah "a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and apart from its 
stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973). "The general rule 
is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders and 
directors and that they will not be held personally liable for the corporations' debts and 
obligations." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations 
and citations omitted). "In so immunizing corporate directors from personal liability, the 
law has proceeded on the theory that in so acting they are but the agents of the 
corporation and that the breach is that of the corporation, and hence it alone is answerable 
therefore [sic].99 Id. 
The alter ego theory "is an equitable doctrine requiring that each case be 
J&T Marketing did not expressly assert an alter ego theory in its Amended Complaint. 
However, J&T Marketing did raise the alter ego doctrine in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [R. 1321.] 
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determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 
P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In applicable situations, the alter ego theory justifies 
piercing the corporate veil, "permitting creditors of the corporation to reach the assets of 
a controlling shareholder." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, 
Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). Utah Courts "have stated that '[c]ourts must balance 
piercing and insulating policies and [should] only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the 
corporate veil.'" Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46). In contract disputes, "[cjourts have been 
extraordinarily reluctant to lift the veil in contract cases, such as this one, where the 
'creditor has willingly transacted business' with the corporation." d'Elia v. Rice Dev., 
Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f28, 147 P.3d 515 (further citations omitted). 
2. The Alter Ego Doctrine Test 
To invoke the equitable alter ego doctrine and disregard the corporate entity, two 
circumstances must exist. "[First], there must be such unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist. . . ; and 
[second], the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, 
or an inequitable result would follow." Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 
P.2d 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). 
Utah courts have identified significant factors that guide a determination of 
whether the unity-of-interest prong (or "formalities requirement") has been violated. 
These factors include the following: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe 
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corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of 
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other 
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice 
or fraud. 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Satisfaction of the second 
prong (or "fairness requirement") is "left to the conscience of the court." d'Elia, 2006 UT 
App 416 at f30. However, the second prong "is not met simply because a trial court finds 
that that form would in some way prevent a creditor of a controlling shareholder from 
quickly being made whole . . . . [I]t is not enough for the creditor to complain that it must 
proceed against the shareholder's assets . . . rather than simply levying on the 
corporation's assets." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). Rather, "it must be shown that the corporation itself played 
a role in the inequitable conduct at issue." Id. 
C. J&T Marketing Did Not Produce Any Credible Evidence to Support the 
Unity of Interest Prong of the Alter Ego Doctrine. 
J&T Marketing claims that it "presented evidence that supported several of the 
Colman factors." Brief of Petitioner at 12.5 The record shows otherwise. As noted by the 
court of appeals, "[t]he disputed fact recited by J&T [Marketing] is not material because 
even if it were true, it is not enough, by itself, to suggest applicability of the alter ego 
theory, especially in the absence of any facts bearing on the other elements and factors 
required to prove the alter ego theory." Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2010 
5
 To the extent that J&T Marketing's citations to the record refers to or references 
Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy deposition, Respondents object to such citations. 
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UTApp 113,1[6,233 P.3d 538. 
1. Lowry and Kinsella Presented Undisputed Evidence to Show that 
Corporate Formalities were Followed. 
As noted by the court of appeals, J&T Marketing's argument "focuses almost 
exclusively" on the seventh factor of the unity-of-interest prong, "the use of the 
corporation as a fa9ade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders." Id. at 
[^8; see also Brief of Petitioner at 11-14. Regarding the seventh factor, Utah courts have 
stated that "[fjailure to distinguish between corporate and personal property, the use of 
corporate funds to pay personal expenses without proper accounting, and failure to 
maintain complete corporate and financial records are looked upon with extreme 
disfavor." Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 n.3 (emphasis added). J&T Marketing has presented 
no evidence, however, that Lowry or Kinsella failed to distinguish their funds from the 
corporation's, that they commingled corporate funds with their own, or that they failed to 
keep proper records. 
On the other hand, the court of appeals has held that evidence demonstrating that 
the corporation observed the requisite corporate formalities is sufficient to preclude 
piercing the corporate veil under the alter ego theory. See Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 
1384, 1390 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Schafir, the district court relied upon copies of the 
corporation's articles of incorporation, minutes from board of director's meetings, 
corporate annual reports filed with the State of Utah, and corporate tax returns for 1983 
and 1984. See id. The record in this case contains similar evidence, undisputed by J&T 
Marketing, that FDS and Esbex.com maintained corporate formalities. 
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In this case, Lowry and Kinsella submitted articles of incorporation for FDS and 
Esbex.com, as well as other corporate documents, demonstrating the maintenance of 
corporate formalities. [R. 1149-1200.] Lowry explained by affidavit that the affairs of 
FDS and Esbex.com were kept separate and distinct and that he and Kinsella kept their 
own personal and financial affairs separate and distinct from both FDS and Esbex.com. 
[R. 1196.] Further, Neubauer, the Chief Financial Officer of FDS and Esbex.com, 
testified that he accounted for and kept track of all withdrawals by Lowry and Kinsella 
and audited the records himself and prepared weekly conciliation reports. [R. 1641, 
Neubauer Dep. 40:3-14; R. 1643, Neubauer Dep. 29:13-21.] Neubauer prepared the 
financial records, including monthly income statements and net profit and loss 
statements, for the corporations, [R. 1642; Neubauer Dep. 36:18-25], and neither FDS 
nor Esbex.com had fraudulent purposes, [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:9-10]. Neubauer 
agreed that Lowry and Kinsella desired to make a profit but such was "true of every 
business." [R. 1668; Neubauer Dep. 11:9-25.] The fact that Lowry and Kinsella took 
money out of the corporation does not show that corporate funds were treated as personal 
property, that proper accounting was absent, or that proper financial records were not 
kept. Indeed, the undisputed evidence as stated above establishes exactly the opposite. 
J&T Marketing presented no evidence that would tend to show that Lowry and 
Kinsella's actions in any way jeopardized the integrity of the corporation or were 
otherwise commercially unreasonable in governing the affairs and operating FDS and 
Esbex.com. [R. 1194-96.] Indeed, Neubauer testified that Lowry and Kinsella instructed 
him to "find a way to free up expenses and free up cash flow" to provide refunds to 
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customers. [R. 1644; Neubauer Dep. 25:7-23.] Again, J&T Marketing presented no 
evidence contradict or dispute these facts. 
In its brief to this Court, J&T Marketing asserts that the court of appeals noted that 
J&T Marketing had presented "significant evidence" to show that Lowry and Kinsella 
took money from the corporation for their personal use without proper documentation. 
See Brief of Petitioner at 13. On the contrary, the court of appeals stated "the evidence 
presented to the district court and called to [its] attention on appeal, viewed in the light 
most favorable to J&T [Marketing], does not support the contention that the money was 
taken 'without proper accounting/" Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., 2010 UT App 113 
at %9 (further citation omitted). Instead of supporting J&T Marketing's contention, the 
court of appeals stated that "[t]he evidence properly of record showed that although 
Lowry and Kinsella took money from FDS when it was struggling to meet its other 
financial obligations, the money was accounted for, and no evidence was produced that 
this accounting was done improperly." Id. The evidence cited to this Court by J&T 
Marketing has not changed, contains no new information, and does not show that the 
court of appeals erred in reaching its conclusion to affirm the district court's ruling on 
summary judgment for Lowry and Kinsella. 
The mere fact that Lowry and Kinsella were distributed money out of the 
corporation, standing alone, does not raise any genuine issue of material fact concerning 
the unity of interest prong of the alter ego theory. Cf Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions 
Co., 2003 UT 57, p 7 , 84 P.3d 1154 (holding that the fact that though tax refund 
payments in an "S" corporation are passed through to shareholders without being exposed 
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to taxation on the corporate level "does not carry with it a suggestion of impropriety or 
inequality"). In d'Elia, the court of appeals noted that the record in that case 
demonstrated that the corporation "appropriately followed certain internal corporate 
formalities." d'Elia, 2006 UT App 416 at f 32. The court of appeals further determined 
that distributions made to the president and sole-shareholder of the corporation "were not 
inappropriate." Id. at f 32. 
J&T Marketing relies solely upon its bare allegation that the withdrawals and 
distributions to Lowry and Kinsella were made "without proper documentation or 
accounting;" J&T Marketing has produced no evidence to support this claim. 
Respondents filed their first motion for summary judgment on May 24, 2005, more than 
two and a half years after J&T Marketing had filed its original complaint. [R. 32, 1200.] 
In other words, J&T Marketing had 30 months to conduct discovery. Indeed, by February 
4, 2004, J&T Marketing had already conducted the depositions of Jon Lowry, Nathan 
Kinsella, Doug Buyers, John Neubauer, Jeremy Warburton, and Will Snowden. [R. 574.] 
In addition, J&T Marketing had conducted twenty-seven short telephonic depositions and 
had sent out notices to conduct nine additional depositions. [R. 573-74.] Further, J&T 
Marketing had sent out nine sets of discovery requests. [R. 1070.] After this elapse of 
time and this expenditure of effort, J&T Marketing has submitted no evidence to support 
its alter ego claims. "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, b u t . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(e). Since J&T Marketing failed to present a single 
disputed issue of material fact concerning the seventh factor of unity of interest and 
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ownership prong, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and 
Kinsella on this factor alone. 
2. J&T Marketing Did Not Present any Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
on Any Other Factors of the Unity-oflnterest Prong. 
In an effort to demonstrate that it was not relying solely on the seventh factor, J&T 
Marketing attempts to cite to record evidence related to other unit-of-interest factors. 
None of the record evidence cited to establishes a genuine issue of material fact that 
would preclude this Court from affirming the court of appeals' decision. 
For example, J&T Marketing asserts that there was "siphoning of corporate funds 
by the dominant stockholder" because the record evidenced that Kinsella took money 
from FDS without telling Lowry. Brief of Petitioner at 12; Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. The 
record citation provided by J&T Marketing, however, does not support such a claim. 
However, there is some testimony in Neubauer's deposition that in his bankruptcy 
deposition Neubauer mentioned that he thought he had discovered that Kinsella was 
"stealing" from Lowry. [R. 1643; Neubauer Dep. at 30:8 to 32:4.] There is no 
foundational support for this "thought." Any reference to the "thought" mostly arises out 
of Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy deposition. The record does not indicate where the 
funds were taken from, only that Neubauer informed Lowry of his belief. [R. 1643; 
Neubauer Dep. 31:3 (quoting from Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy deposition. J&T 
Marketing has not appealed the ruling of the district court striking the bankruptcy 
deposition).] Even if the deposition testimony was taken at face value, the Court would 
have to assume that Kinsella was "stealing" corporate funds, that those corporate funds 
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belonged to FDS not to Esbex.com, that Kinsella was the dominant stockholder, and that 
the amount taken was significant. There is no evidence that Kinsella was the dominant 
stockholder, that the amount was significant, and most importantly no foundation for 
Neubauer's thought or belief was ever established. The undisputed evidence is that 
Lowry and Kinsella jointly were shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS and 
Esbex.com. [R. 1700.] 
Second, J&T Marketing claims that evidence was presented to show that Lowry 
and Kinsella used FDS "in promoting injustice or fraud." Brief of Petitioner at 12; 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. To support its claims, J&T Marketing argues that Lowry and 
Kinsella kept returned products and resold them to new customers, that Lowry and 
Kinsella knew they were taking money earmarked for customer refunds, and that Lowry 
and Kinsella knowingly sold on-going coaching services and failed to report those fees to 
J&T Marketing. Brief of Petitioner at 12. In each instance, the record citations provided 
by J&T Marketing fail to lend support to these claims. 
The returned products were "products that people didn't want" that were sent back 
to FDS for a refund. [R. at 1647; Neubauer Dep 16:5-7.] According to the evidence, 
these returned products were resold to new clients "during the period of time when [J&T 
Marketing] was not shipping" product to FDS. [R. at 1647; Neubauer Dep. 16:11-13.] 
While the evidence indicates that Neubauer consulted with Lowry and/or Kinsella 
whether to fill orders with refunded product, [R. at 1647: Neubauer Dep. 16:20-21], no 
evidence in the record indicates that that Lowry and/or Kinsella "were acting outside of 
their positions within the corporations." [R. at 1694.] The evidence in the record 
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indicates that Lowry and Kinsella were informed of customers that should receive 
refunds and that Lowry and Kinsella instructed Neubauer "to find a way to free up 
expenses and free up cash flow." [R. at 1644; Neubauer Dep. at 25:21-22.] However, the 
evidence does not show that Lowry and Kinsella were taking money earmarked for 
customer refunds. Finally, Neubauer testified that he did not report coaching fees to J&T 
Marketing because he believed it was money belonging to FDS and/or Esbex.com. 
Neubauer testified "I am not going to say [Lowry] told me not to report it because I might 
have done that on my own, given the circumstances." [R. at 1644; Neubauer Dep. 28:5-
7.] Again, nothing in these statements from Neubauer's deposition indicates that 
Respondents were acting outside of the corporate positions, and no other evidence has 
been produced by J&T Marketing. 
Even if one were to assume that there was merit to any of these arguments, the 
arguments all arise out of the interpretation of the Agreement between J&T Marketing 
and FDS. In other words, J&T Marketing could argue that the contract did not allow use 
of funds for such a purpose, and FDS could argue that the contract allowed said use. In 
reality, the question raised by J&T Marketing is not what Lowry and Kinsella did, but 
what FDS did.6 Finally, as noted by the court of appeals, the record evidence "showed 
that although Lowry and Kinsella took money from FDS when it was struggling to meet 
its other financial obligations, the money was accounted for, and no evidence was 
produced that this accounting was done improperly." Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., 
6
 The court of appeals has already ruled on Lowry and Kinsella's individual liability for 
tortious conduct, and that decision is not before this Court on certiorari review. See Jones 
& Trevor Marketing, 2010 UT App 113 at ^11-17. 
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2010 UT App 113 at f9. J&T Marketing never alleged or argued that the amounts 
received by Lowry or Kinsella were excessive or inappropriate. 
Finally, J&T Marketing asserts that it presented evidence that FDS and Esbex.com 
were undercapitalized by virtue of their insolvency and dissolution in November 2004. 
Brief of Petitioner at 12. Neither FDS nor Esbex.com was "a one-man corporation." 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. Insolvency does not make maintaining the corporate form 
unjust or inequitable. J&T Marketing submits no evidence that would tend to support its 
claim that insolvency was caused by undercapitalization. On the other hand, the record 
more persuasively shows that the financial struggles of FDS were more likely caused by 
J&T Marketing's actions. [R. 1699.] There is no evidence that FDS and Esbex.com were 
undercapitalized at the time FDS entered into the Agreement with J&T Marketing in 
February 2002 or at the time that J&T Marketing filed its complaint in August 2002. 
Instead, both FDS and Esbex.com continued to operate after J&T Marketing filed its 
initial complaint and neither voluntarily dissolved until November 2004. [R. 1698.] Yet 
the fact of their voluntary dissolution is J&T Marketing's sole evidence of 
undercapitalization. 
None of the record evidence cited to by J&T Marketing establishes a genuine issue 
of material fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment for Lowry and Kinsella 
on J&T Marketing's alter ego claims. Instead, the undisputed record evidence shows that 
FDS and Esbex.com maintained corporate formalities. Without evidence to establish any 
of the factors for the unity-of-interest prong, J&T Marketing's alter ego claims must fail 
as a matter of law. 
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D. J&T Marketing Did Not Produce Any Evidence to Support the Fairness 
Prong of the Alter Ego Doctrine. 
The equitable alter ego doctrine may only be invoked to disregard the corporate 
entity if both prongs of the alter ego doctrine are met. See Norman v. Murray First Thrift 
& Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). According to the second prong, the 
corporate veil will be pierced only if "the observance of the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." Id. Because it 
determined that J&T Marketing failed "to demonstrate a meaningfully factual dispute 
relevant to the first prong" of the alter ego doctrine, the court of appeals did not address 
the second prong. Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., 2010 Ct App 113 at |10 n8. Even if 
this prong were found to be relevant, J&T Marketing presents no evidence in its brief to 
this Court to show that the second prong has been met. Because J&T Marketing's claims 
all arise out of its contractual agreement with FDS, it is difficult to see how maintaining 
the integrity of corporate veil and limiting J&T Marketing's remedies to those that it 
freely and willfully bargained for in the Agreement would "sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice," or conclude in "an inequitable result." 
J&T Marketing has presented no evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of 
material fact on the second prong of the alter ego theory. Therefore, the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment on that issue to Lowry and Kinsella, and this Court 
should affirm. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
J&T Marketing entered into a contractual agreement with FDS in February 2002. 
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For various reasons, the business arrangement fell apart. Unsatisfied with its contractual 
remedies against FDS, J&T Marketing sought to hold Lowry and Kinsella individually 
liable for the claimed wrongs. However, J&T Marketing has not demonstrated genuine 
issues of material fact that would preclude this Court from affirming the court of appeals' 
and the district court's determinations that the alter ego doctrine should not apply to 
pierce the corporate veil. Therefore, Respondents Lowry and Kinsella respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Lowry and 
Kinsella are entitled to summary judgment on J&T Marketing's alter ego claim. 
Dated this 3 0 day of December, 2010, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Earl Jay Peclc 
R. Christopher Preston 
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 3t> day of December, 2010, two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF were mailed, first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to 
each of the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Jessica Griffin Anderson 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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Summary Judgment, entered on February 1, 2006 
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Judgment entered on March 21, 2006 
Tab E Order Granting Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, entered October 8, 2008 
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Lowry, 2010 UTApp 113 
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Tab A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH p | L E D 
"^Sty — - o o O o o UTAH APPELATE COURTS 
JUL 2 6 2010 
Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc.f 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20100449-SC 
Jonathan L. Lowry; Nathan 
Kinsella; Financial 
Development Services, Inc.; 
Jeremy Warburton; John 
Neubauer; and Esbex.com, Inc., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on June 4, 2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utahj Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue. 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of Respondents' 
liability under the alter ego doctrine. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. 
For The Court: 
Dated *$•%£>-10 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Assoc ia te Chief J u s t i c e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 27, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, 
or hand delivered to the parties listed below: 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY 
JESSICA GRIFFIN ANDERSON 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ LC 
4844 N 300 W STE 300 
PROVO UT 84604 
EARL JAY PECK 
R. CHRISTOPHER PRESTON 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC 
WALKER CENTER 
175 S MAIN ST STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
FOURTH DISTRICT, AMERICAN FORK 
ATTN: SHARON JONES 
75 E 80 N STE 202 BX 460 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003-1660 
Dated this August 27, 2010. 
By OJ^MJJ^^^ 
Judicial Assistant 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20100449 
FOURTH DISTRICT, AMERICAN FORK Case No. 050100038 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20080904 
TabB 
RUG 22 2002 9:08flM ,,p LASERJET 3200 p . o 
SALES AND MARKETING AGREEMENT 
This Sales and Marketing Agreement is made and is effective this s \ of January 2002, by and 
between FDS ("Seller") and Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ("Jones"). 
RECITAL 
Seller desires to perform certain sales and telemarketing services as on the terms and conditions 
set forth to herein. 
PROVISIONS 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Scope of the Agreement: Seller agrees as an independent contractor, to sell these products 
designated for sale by Jones ("Jones' products") to those leads, supplied by Jones ("Jones' leads") 
as further defined by the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, 
2. Seller's Services: 
A. Seller will market and sell Jones products to Jones leads during the term of this 
agreement 
B. Seller will work toward developing marketing strategies (and will inform Jones) for 
distribution of Jones' products to Jones' leads; provided however, before implementing 
any marketing strategies the strategies will be approved by Jones in writing. 
C. Seller will get credit card approvals for sales of Jones' products using FDS' merchant 
account. 
D. Sales paid by check will be made payable to Jones and Trevor Marketing, Inc. 
E. Seller can make available, if needed, a dedicated 800 number so that Jones can include 
this number in its products, 
F. Seller will use marketing scripts already being used and included as Exhibit A. 
G. Seller will do its best to keep returns below 15% and generate at least $200 per lead 
after cancels. 
H. Seller will also be able to sell its own 4 week start-up coaching program for a one-time 
fee of $995 plus charge a $99 ongoing monthly coaching service fee. 
I Seller will fax or email orders, for Jones' products, daily to Jones. 
3. Services by Jones: 
A. Jones shall provide Seller leads, which will include the names, addresses, and phone 
numbers, to allow Seller to perform its duties hereunder. 
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B. Seller will submit a report of Seller's previous week's sales and the compensation and 
reimbursement due Jones as defined in Section 5. Report shall be sent by Seller each 
Friday for the sales made the two weeks prior. Report will include, but not be limited to: 
(i) A breakdown and total, by order, showing the monies due to Jones as defined 
in Section 5, Compensation and Reimbursement. 
(ii) A breakdown of each bad check, customer return and credit card chargeback. 
These are defined as "Cancels'* and the commissions previously retained by 
Seller for these sales will be deducted on each weekly wire made by the Seller. 
C. Jones shall provide Seller leads on each Friday. 
D. Seller will process all credit card sales on Seller's merchant accounts. 
4. Seller's Representations, Warranties. & Covenants: 
A. Seller represents and warrants that it is not a party to any agreement, which would be 
breached by execution, delivery, and performance of the terms of this Agreement to be 
performed by the Seller. 
B. Seller represents and warrants that it has all rights to any material used and furnished 
by it in connection with performance of its service hereunder. 
C. Seller acknowledges that as a result of its agreement hereunder, it shall be making use 
of, acquiring or adding to confidential information of a special unique nature and value 
relating to any Jones' trade secrets, systems, programs, procedures, manuals, confidential 
reports, and communications and customer lists (including Jones' customer list) 
("Confidential Information"), Seller further acknowledges that this information is a 
valuable, special, and unique asset of Jones and that such information is and shall remain 
the property of Jones. Additionally, Seller acknowledges that Jones may suffer 
substantial harm if the Confidential Information or any confidential information is 
disclosed including, without limitation, the list of Jones' leads. Therefore, Seller 
covenants and agrees to hold the Confidential Information in confidence and neither to 
use the Confidential Information for its own benefit or for the benefit of another, nor 
disclose the Confidential Information, now or in the future, except for the use and 
disclosure with the prior written consent of Jones or in the performance of Seller's duties 
for Jones' benefit during the term of and under this Agreement. Additionally, Seller 
covenants and agrees not to directly or indirectly by phone, mail, fax, email, website, or 
otherwise solicit Jones' leads except in the performance of its duties for Jones' benefit 
under and during the term of this Agreement. The covenants set forth in this paragraph 
shall survive termination of the Seller's engagement under this Agreement indefinitely. 
D. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall not, directly or indirectly, as an employee, 
shareholder, partner, independent contractor or otherwise, for any reason whatsoever, 
during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years following 
termination of this Agreement, for any reason, solicit, recruit, or in any manner attempt to 
solicit or recruit a person that is an employee of Jones to leave such employment 
relationship or induce such person to leave such relationship. 
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E, Seller covenants and agrees that upon termination of this Agreement, it shall return all 
Jones' materials provide by Jones (or an entity designated by Jones) to be sold by Seller 
hereunder or to be used by the Seller to assist Seller's selling efforts hereunder including, 
but not limited to, Jones' products, videos, audio reproductions, or testimonial letters. 
F, Seller covenants and agrees that it shall perform its services diligently on behalf of 
Jones and shall refrain from engaging in any activity which directly or indirectly could be 
considered misleading, puffing, false, or deceptive, 
G, Seller covenants and agrees that it shall either itself or through its attorneys review and 
comply with the laws of the state in which it markets and sells Jones5 products to Jones* 
leads and the laws of the United States of America including, without limitation, Federal 
Trade Commission Rules, Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Practices Laws, State 
Home Solicitation Acts and State Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
5. Compensation and Reimbursement: 
A. In consideration of Seller performing its services hereunder, Jones agrees to pay and 
reimburse seller: 
(i) A commission equal to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller not including 
shipping charges by Jones. Out of that 60%, Seller will place 10% of all gross sales 
into a reserve fund for any Cancels that may occur, Any Cancels, defined as all 
returns, bad checks, and credit card chargebacks, will be paid from that reserve fund 
and reported in a weekly reconciliation report. At the end of six months, a financial 
reconciliation of that reserve will be completed and provided to Jones. 
(ii) Commissions are to be sent via bank wire each Friday for the previous week. 
6. Holdback: 
A. Seller will hold back 2.5% (two and one half percent) of the sales due to Jones each 
week until Seller has on reserve of Jones $100,000. These funds will be used as a reserve 
against bad checks, credit card returns and chargebacks for sales that were made prior to 
the termination of this agreement. Jones' sales portion of all bad checks, credit card 
returns and chargebacks that occur after the termination of this agreement will be 
deducted from this reserve. 
B. Since the credit card chargebacks process may occur up to 6 months after the date of 
the sale and take another 6 months in the paperwork process (total of 12 months) the 
remaining reserve will be returned as follows: 
(i) $10,000 per month beginning 3 months after the termination of this 
agreement. 
7. Independent Contractor; 
A. The parties acknowledge that the relationship established by this agreement is one of 
independent contractor/contractor and not employee/employer. The parties are 
responsible for paying their own respective employees, any taxes resulting from sales 
made or commissions paid or earned pursuant to this Agreement, withholding takes, 
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unemployment taxes, state, federal and local taxes and the like. Neither party may hold 
itself out as a representative of the other party except as specifically set forth in this 
Agreement. 
8, Indemnification: 
A. Seller agrees to defend, hold harmless and indemnify Jones from any and all 
liabilities, expenses, actions, suits, proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the 
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of 
any term, condition, representation, warranty, or covenant contained in this Agreement 
by Seller. 
B. Jones1 shall defend, hold harmless indemnify Seller from any and all liabilities, 
expenses, actions, suits, claims' proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys* fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the 
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of 
any term, condition, representation, warranty or covenant contained in this Agreement by 
Jones. 
9, Term: 
A. The term of this Agreement shall be for twelve (12) months. This Agreement shall 
automatically renew for twelve (12) months if its termination is not confirmed in writing 
anytime prior to the end of the current term. This Agreement may be terminated prior to 
the end of the term as follows: 
(i) Seller may terminate this Agreement upcn breach by Jones of any term or 
condition to be performed by Jones in this Agreement which is not cured by 
Jones within ten (10) days of the written notice from Seller. 
(ii) Jones may terminate this Agreement at anytime upon 45 days notice to Seller. 
Upon Termination any funds held back by Seller under Paragraph 6A will be 
returned to seller in a manner consistent with 6B(I). 
10, Obligations on Termination: 
A. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall immediately cease: 
(i) Any contact with Jones' leads; 
(ii) Selling Jones' products; 
(iii) In any way representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and 
(iv) The use of Jones' trademarks service marks or other Confidential 
Information. 
B. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall provide Jones a final accounting of 
compensation and reimbursement due Jones and forward funds within 10 business days 
by bank wire transfer. 
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C. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall return to Jones all Jones' 
Confidential Information, including Jones' customer leads or lists, and all Jones' 
products, within forty eight (48) hours of termination by overnight delivery service. 
11. Miscellaneous: 
A. This Agreement: 
(i) Shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto and 
supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, concerning the subject matter 
herein and there are no oral understandings, statements or stipulations bearing 
upon the effect of this Agreement which have not been incorporates herein. 
(ii) May be modified or amended only by a written instrument signed by each of 
the parties hereto, 
(iii) Shall bind and insure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, Successors and assigns, 
B. All notices hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been delivered 
on the day of mailing if sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return 
receipt requested to the addresses set forth at the beginning of this Agreement or such 
other address known by party sending notice hereunder, 
C. Any litigation involving this Agreement shall be adjudicated in a court with 
jurisdiction located in Utah County, Orem, Utah and the parties irrevocably consent to 
the personal jurisdiction and venue of such court 
D. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by 
competent authority, such provision shall be constructed so as to be limited or reduced to 
be enforceable to the maximum extent compatible with the law as it shall then appear. 
The total invalidity or enforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement shall 
not affect the other provisions hereof and this Agreement shall be consumed in all 
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision were omitted 
E. In the event of litigation to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the 
losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party's cost and expenses incurred including, 
without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the first date above 
written. 
Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. FDS 
By: <neS^u4U,( B y Q ^ H-H-yr 
Its: ^C-V^-S Its: <ktf&JX^ 
Date: 0\lf f?C-^_ Date: F<-t Y l ^ ' V 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC. ' 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN 
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX, LLC, 
Defendants. 
RULING GRANTING IN PART 
DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND 
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Jonathan L. Lowry's and Nathan Kinsella's 
("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21,2005. Plaintiff Jones & Trevor 
Marketing ("Plaintiff or "J &T Marketing") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2005. On 
July 21, 2005, Defendants' filed their Memorandum in Reply in conjunction with a motion to strike the 
bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer. Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on August 1,2005. The 
Court heard oral argument on both motions on September 22, 2005. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Mr. Stephen Quesenberry, the Defendants were represented by Mr. Benjamin T. Wilson. 
At the hearing, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike, but allowed J&T Marketing the 
opportunity to depose Mr. Neubauer again, this time in the presence of Defendants' counsel. On 
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November 22, 2005, subsequent to the taking of Mr. Neubauer's deposition, Plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
December 12, 2005, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion for 
summary judgment. Both parties filed notices to submit for decision, and neither request asked the 
Court to hear oral argument again on the matter. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
After careful review of the pleadings, the Court finds the following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Plaintiff J&T Marketing is a Nevada corporation that sells training courses developed by its 
owner and principal, Ted Thomas. These courses offer information to those who purchase them 
about how to buy tax lien certificates and engage in other similar activities to make money. 
(Amd. Cpl. m 1,10). 
2. Defendant FDS was a Utah corporation from June 22,1998 until November 3, 2004 when it was 
dissolved. (Amd. Cpl. ^  2; Dept. of Commerce Record). During its existence, FDS was engaged 
in sales and telemarketing activities. (Amd. Cpl. f 11; Lowry Aff. f 2). 
3. In late 2001 or early 2002, an employee of FDS, Steve Bullpit, contacted Ted Thomas (President 
of J&T Marketing) on behalf of FDS to explore the potential for a business relationship. 
(Thomas Depo. p. 20-22). 
4. On January 31,2002, J&T Marketing entered into a "Sales and Marketing Agreement" with FDS 
whereby J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales 
leads and FDS marketed and sold Ted Thomas courses through telemarketing and other sales 
efforts. (Amd. Cpl. K 12, 28; Sales and Marketing Agreement; Lowry Aff. % 12). 
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5. The Contract provided, among other things that FDS could enroll purchasers of Ted Thomas 
courses in a program to provide coaching services for $99 per month. (Amd. Cpl. ^ f 13; Sales 
and Marketing Agreement). 
6. The Agreement allowed FDS to sell its coaching program and charge monthly on-going service 
fees. (Thomas Aff. f 2H). The Agreement also required Jones to pay FDS a "commission equal 
to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller." (Id at Tf 5(a)(i)). 
6. Defendant Esbex.com was created in September 2000 by Defendants Lowry and Kinsella as a 
product fulfillment company to fulfill product and service orders received through the sales and 
telemarketing efforts of FDS and other telemarketing companies (Kinsella I Depo. 11:19-25; 
Neubauer Depo. p. 43) 
7. Esbex.com was a DBA of FDS until June 2002, when it became Esbex.com , Inc., a Utah 
corporation. (Amd. Cpl. f 7; Dept. of Chamber of Commerce Record). Esbex.com provided 
coaching/mentoring services to purchasers of the Ted Thomas courses. (Amd. Cpl. ffl 11,14). 
Esbex.com was dissolved on November 29, 2004. (Dept. Of Commerce Record). 
8. Defendant John Neubauer is a former employee and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief 
Operating Officer of FDS. From the time Mr. Neubauer took over responsibility for the finances 
of FDS in February 2002 until he left a year later, FDS struggled and found it difficult to make 
payroll for its approximately 40 employees. (Neubauer Depo. p. 16-17,40-41; Lowry Depo. 
9:19-21). 
9. Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T Marketing. All communications with 
J&T Marketing came through Neubauer. He was FDS's point person and ran the business on a 
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day-to-day basis. (Neubauer 16:19-21; Lukas Depo. p.17). Neubauer left FDS in early 2003. 
(Kinsella I Depo. 18:1-2; Lowry Depo. 29:11-13). 
10. Defendant Jeremy Warburton was a former employee of FDS and manager of FDS's 
telemarketing department. In that position, Mr. Warburton helped coordinate FDS's sales and 
marketing efforts. (Amd. Cpl. ffif 3,17; Lowry Aff. f 7). 
11. Defendants Lowry and Kinsella were the only two shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS 
and Esbex.com, until those companies dissolved in 2004. (Amd. Cpl. f^l[ 5-6; Kinsella I Depo. 
8:10-15, 11:19-25; Lowry Depo. pp. 17-18). 
12. Esbex.com provided product fulfillment services for not only FDS, but also for other companies. 
(Delia Kinsella Depo. II 9:11,15-20). 
13. FDS experienced trouble using its Visa and MasterCard merchant accounts to clear money on 
purchases. Because the credit card purchases were expensive and transacted over the phone, they 
resulted in a large number of refunds and charge backs and, occasionally, frozen merchant 
accounts. (Neubauer Depo. 18: 10-22). 
14. FDS's problems with its merchant accounts culminated when a major merchant account 
containing credit card charges for Plaintiffs Ted Thomas courses was frozen. (Neubauer 35:11-
25, 39:22-25,40:1-24; Lowry Aff. K 13). 
15. Plaintiff J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted Thomas courses for a 
number of reasons, including: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of the product if payment 
was delayed (Lukas Depo. 26:25-27:1, 63:10-22), J&T Marketing employed temporary shipping 
clerks to assist with product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing training and 
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supervision issues. (Lukas Depo. pp. 65-73; Neubauer Depo. p. 34) 
16. J&T Marketing also ceased shipping its Ted Thomas courses due to the dispute over payment. 
(Lowry Aff. f^ 13). Failure to receive the courses they had purchased with their credit cards 
resulted in dissatisfied customers, and charge backs on FDS's credit card merchant accounts. 
(Neubauer 25:10-18, pp. 33-34, 93:11-17; Lowry Depo. p. 39-40). 
17. J&T Marketing withheld delivery on orders because FDS had not timely paid J&T Marketing. 
FDS withheld payment to J&T Marketing because a percentage of its sales would not go through 
resulting in charge backs. (Lowry Depo. 49:6-23; Thomas 263: 13-17). 
18. On or about July 19,2002, FDS communicated to J&T Marketing that FDS believed that J&T 
Marketing was in breach of the Sales and Marketing Agreement. (Lowry Aff. f 14). Lowry, 
FDS's President, sent J&T Marketing the letter canceling the Agreement. 
19. On or about August 29, 2002, J&T Marketing filed suit against FDS and several of its officers 
and employees (Amd. Cpl.) and on or about November 15,2002 FDS filed a counterclaim. 
(Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 11/15/2002). 
20. J&T Marketing's Amended Complaint, dated June 17,2004, alleges the following causes of 
action: 
a. Breach of Contract against FDS for selling courses after the contract had been terminated. 
b. Theft by Conversion against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS by willfully interfering 
with J&T Marketing's chattel. 
c. Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS related to 
FDS's performance of the contract. 
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d. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against FDS 
e. Accounting against FDS. 
£ Injunctive Relief against Lowry, Kinsella, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com to enjoin 
them from future sales and marketing of the Ted Thomas courses, 
g. Constructive Fraud against Lowry, Kinsella, Warburton and FDS because they "shared a 
confidential relationship based on their business activities" and "failed to disclose 
material facts to J&T Marketing." 
h. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Lowry, Kinsella and FDS related to Defendants' 
activities vis-a-vis Plaintiffs customers and clients. 
i. Intentional Interference with Business Relations against Lowry, Kinsella and FDS for 
interfering with Plaintiffs existing and potential economic relations with clients and sales 
leads. 
21. On or about November 3, 2004, FDS and Esbex.com determined that they were insolvent and 
dissolved. (Lowry Aff. <|[ 18). 
22. FDS and Esbex.com considered the coaching services to not be included under the Sales and 
Marketing Agreement. 
23. FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and turned around and shipped them out to its 
customers. (Bankruptcy Depo 62:14-22; Oct. 18 Depo. 16:4-8). 
24. The owners, Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the business. (Neubauer Bankruptcy Depo. 
92:3-13). 
25. Lowry and Kinsella determined the allocation of monies of FDS and Esbex. (Bank. Depo. 93:13-
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14, 94:9-12. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants move for summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second cause of action for 
conversion, third cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, seventh cause of action for fraud, 
eighth cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, and ninth cause of action for intentional 
interference with business relations. 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 426 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving elements of his or her cause of 
action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's 
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex 
Corp v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). 
The Alter Ego Doctrine and Piercing the Corporate Veil 
A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders. Dockstader v. Walker. 
510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); see also, Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24,26 (Utah 1990). The limited liability afforded to shareholders permit them to make capital 
contributions to business enterprises without placing personal assets at risk. David H. Barber, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-373 (1981); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
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Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 46 n.9 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
The alter ego doctrine is an exception to this rule. Shareholders can be personally liable if there 
is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals." 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, the court must find that 
observing the corporate form under such circumstances would "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity." Id. 
Courts will "only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 
P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr.. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 
26 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine 
requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp.. 761 P.2d 42, 26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); (quoting National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp.. 341 F.2d 1022,1023 
(8th Cir. 1965)). The Court should examine the following factors to determine whether there is such 
unity of interest that the corporate veil should be pierced: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) 
nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) 
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the 
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P,2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Many of Plaintiff s causes of action 
against Defendants rest on the alter ego doctrine. 
Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that would allow Plaintiff to pierce the 
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corporate veil. Defendants were at all times acting in their corporate capacities and not personally. 
Defendants also argue that many of Plaintiff s causes of action are really summed up in the breach of 
contract claim, which would not implicate the Defendants personally. Limited liability to encourage 
investment is the purpose of a corporation, and as noted, the corporate veil should be reluctantly pierced. 
Plaintiff contends that there are material issues of fact in dispute as to whether FDS and 
Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff cites to the Neubauer depositions to 
demonstrate that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds 
for personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is corroborated by the 
October 18, 2005 deposition. 
Plaintiffs citation to the Neubauer depositions does not create an issue as to a material fact as to 
whether FDS and Esbex.com were the alter egos of Defendants, Plaintiff points to Neubauer's 
statements regarding the decision to continue selling coaching, and to keep the money derived from 
these sales. Neubauer testified that he understood proceeds from the coaching services to not be covered 
under the Sales and Marketing Agreement, so that these funds were not supposed to be remitted to J&T 
Marketing, whether it was before or after the cancellation of the Agreement (the timing of which is 
unclear from the deposition). Plaintiffs claim is properly characterized as breach of contract based on 
its interpretation of the contract, and does not implicate the Defendants personally. 
Plaintiff cites to Neubauer's testimony that "FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and 
turned around and shipped them out to its customers." While Neubauer testified that he would consult 
with one of the Defendants before sending out these products, the statement is that FDS performed these 
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activities. There is no indication that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their positions 
within the corporations. 
While Neubauer states that Kinsella and Lowry took money from the businesses, he does not 
state that it was done improperly. In fact, Neubauer states that he doesn't remember how the money was 
taken out by Kinsella and Lowry, whether by official paycheck or otherwise. (Neubauer Oct. Depo. 40:3-
14). He also testified that he did not have information with regards to whether the Defendants acted 
fraudulently with respect to J&T Marketing, and that he thought FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate 
companies. (Neubauer Oct Depo. 42:4-15). Significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that it was Neubauer 
who ran the day-to-day operations of the businesses and handled communication with J&T Marketing. 
Without evidence to show that the Defendants acted in their personal capacity or took funds 
improperly, Plaintiff cannot sustain its allegation of alter ego. 
Conversion 
Theft by conversion requires the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v. 
TwitchelL 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that they converted the property of 
J&T Marketing to their own use. FDS allegedly failed to remit 40% of sales to J&T Marketing, but even 
accepting this fact as true, it does not show the Defendants converted J&T Marketing property to 
Defendants' personal use. Failure to remit is a claim for breach of contract, not conversion. 
Plaintiff contends that FDS and Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff 
contends that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds for 
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personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. The Court has already 
decided that the alter ego doctrine does not apply to the acts of Defendants, and the corporate veil should 
not be pierced. The Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the conversion claim. 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
In order to prove fraud, the Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be 
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) and was thereby induced 
to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002). 
The Defendant argues that contractual promises are not statements of presently existing material 
facts, unless a party makes those promises without any intent to perform. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants made fraudulent statements by inducing J&T Marketing 
to enter into the contract with FDS without any intention to fully perform. Plaintiff contends that 
Defendants misrepresented sales and refunds in weekly reconciliation reports and used Ted Thomas' 
name after the Agreement had been canceled. 
There is no evidence at the time of the contract the Defendants had a present intent not to 
perform. Whether the Sales and Marketing Agreement entitled J&T Marketing to a percentage of the 
sales from the coaching services is a question of contract interpretation. The Court has already found 
that Plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil. Any misrepresentations as to weekly reconciliation reports 
or regarding the volume and type of sales made, do not implicate the Defendants personally. There is 
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also no evidence that either Defendant made statements of presently existing material facts that were 
false. 
One exception is Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract "FDS would cease 
selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads." There is evidence in the record 
that FDS disregarded this representation completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim against 
Lowry. 
Constructive Fraud 
Constructive fraud requires Plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff 
reposed trust in the Defendants based on an existing fiduciary relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
Defendants argue that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff contends 
that FDS had confidential customer lists and that this is the basis for finding a confidential relationship. 
As a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS 
which extended to its officers and directors. Both businesses negotiated a commercial contract at arms 
length. That contractual relationship did not grant to FDS the exclusive control over J&T Marketing's 
interests that would give rise to a confidential relationship. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 291 
(Utah 2003). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Defendants as officers and directors were 
responsible for failures to disclose. 
Fraudulent Non-disclosure 
A party alleging fraudulent non-disclosure must prove the following three elements, (1) the 
nondisclosed information was material, (2) the nondisclosed information is know to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241-242 
(Utah 2002). 
The Plaintiff cites no case law supporting its argument that the Defendants had a legal duty to 
speak. Absent a relationship that would give rise to this duty, Defendants did not have a duty to 
communicate to Plaintiff. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Defendants 
should be personally liable under this cause of action. 
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Defendant argues that this is merely a restatement of J&T Marketing's claims for breach of 
contract and fraud. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with one of Plaintiff s current or 
prospective business relationships. 
Plaintiff argues that it was FDS that interfered with J&T Marketing's business relationships, but 
that the corporate veil should be pierced. 
Without piercing the corporate veil, this cause of action cannot implicate the Defendants 
personally. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC., : 
Plaintiff, ! 
vs. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN 
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS 
LOWRY'S AND KINSELLA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Division 9 - American Fork 
Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella ("Defendants") submitted a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on May 20, 2005. Oral arguments were heard by the above-entitled 
Court on September 22, 2005, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, Fourth District Court 
Judge. Defendants appeared and were represented by their attorney, Benjamin T. Wilson; 
Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., appeared and was represented by its attorney, Stephen 
Quesenberry. On October 19, 2005, this Court issued its Order RE: Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, permitting Plaintiff to take the deposition of John Neubauer and submit an 
amended memorandum in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion. The deposition 
of John Neubauer was held on October 18, 2005, and supplemental memoranda were submitted 
MAR 2 1 2006 
\) 
^
V 4 T H DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
by both parties. This Court having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed all the 
memoranda of each party, being duly advised in the premises, with good cause appearing, issued 
a Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on February 1, 2006 ("Ruling"), the entirety of which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
Based upon the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law contained in the Ruling, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Second Cause of 
Action (Theft by Conversion) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action 
(Fraudulent Misrepresentation) against Defendant Kinsella is granted. Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation) against Defendant Lowry is granted except as to Plaintiffs claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation based on Defendant Lowry's alleged written statement that 
on termination of the contract "FDS would cease selling Thomas's product and cease 
using Thomas's name and leads." 
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of 
Action (Constructive Fraud) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Eighth Cause of Action 
(Fraudulent Non-Disclosure) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
5. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action 
(Intentional Interference with Business Relations) is granted. 
4849-3834-0352.LO001.001 O 
DATED this _^/_ day of March, 2006. 
BY THE C 
APPROVJEB AS TO FORM this _ L day of March, 2006. 
rabl^ De^ ek P. Pldku^ 
'strict (GppS Judge, J# 
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StepnfeiiQuesefeberry 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _/#_ day of March, 2006, I served upon the following a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND 
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by causing the same to be 
delivered by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Earl Jay Peck (2562) STATE^Fu£L 
R. Christopher Preston (9195) UTAH COUNTY 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 S. State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Jonathan L. Lowry 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN 
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
JONATHAN L. LOWRY'S MOTION 
FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Division 9 - American Fork 
Judge: Howard Maetani 
The individual Defendants Jonathan L. Lowy and Nathan Kinsella jointly moved for 
Summary Judgment on the allegations of the Amended Complaint on May 20, 2005; the matter 
was briefed and argued; and, in February 2006, the Court ruled, granting the motion completely 
as to Defendant Kinsella and granting the motion partially as to Defendant Lowry, reserving 
solely the issue of a claim for a specific alleged fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Mr. 
Lowry under the Third Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint. (The February 1, 2006 
Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
referred to herein as "Ruling".) The reservation went to only Mr. Lowry's alleged 
misrepresentation that "FDS would cease selling Thomas's (Plaintiffs) product and cease using 
Thomas's name and Leads." 
On October 9, 2007, Plaintiff appealed the February 2006 Ruling and the attendant Order 
entered in March 2006, but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal in February 2008 on the 
ground that the appeal had been taken before a final order had been entered, i.e., the remaining 
issue of fraudulent misrepresentation had not been disposed of. Upon remand, the Court held a 
scheduling conference on May 5, 2008, and a discussion was had at the conference among the 
Court and counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant Lowry about the remaining issue. At the 
conclusion of the conference the Court represented that the Court would exercise its discretion to 
revisit the remaining issue on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly a briefing schedule 
was established at the conference. 
Subsequently, Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry, the only remaining individual Defendant, 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting memorandum and submissions dated 
June 23, 2008, on the sole remaining issue. Plaintiff responded with its memorandum and 
submissions on July 16, 2008. Defendant filed a reply memorandum on July 28, 2008. 
Defendant Jon Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on 
Friday August 22, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. Earl Jay Peck of the law firm, of Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC, 
appeared on behalf of Defendant Jon Lowry. Jessica Griffin Anderson of the law firm of Hill, 
Johnson and Schmutz, LC appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and considered 
the respective memoranda and submissions, the Court finds, concludes and orders as follows: 
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L The Court has exercised its discretion to re-examine the remaining claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation against individual Defendant Jonathan Lowry. 
2. The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show evidence of a 
disputed material fact, i.e., that the alleged statement was made. 
a. As stated in its Ruling of February 1, 2006, "[i]n order to prove fraud, the 
Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be 
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which 
to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it, (8) and was thereby induced to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince 
v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 41, 56 P.3d 524, 536. 
b. Mr. Lowry argues that he did not make the alleged representation. Plaintiff 
argues that the contract contains a provision that upon termination FDS would 
stop selling Plaintiffs product and cease using its name and leads. 
c. By its very nature a contractual promise to perform in the future is not a 
statement of a presently existing material fact unless the promise is made with out 
any intent to perform, that is, "a promise of future performance, when made with 
a present intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on 
that promise, constitutes actionable deceit and fraud," Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
d. The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff neither presented nor 
proposed any evidence or argument that would allow a reasonable person to 
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conclude that Mr. Lowry had no intent to perform the obligations in the contract 
between the parties when he signed the contract between FDS and Plaintiff. 
e. Nothing was submitted to cause the Court to change its conclusion found 
in the prior Ruling that "[t]here is no evidence at the time of the contract the 
Defendants had a present intent not to perform. (Ruling at 11.) The Court 
concludes, therefore, that as a matter of law the statements in the contract between 
the parties do not satisfy the requirement that the alleged misrepresentation 
purport to be a statement of a currently existing material fact. 
f. Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Lowry made the subject alleged 
misrepresentation in a letter he signed and sent to Plaintiff dated July 19,2002. In 
the July 16, 2001, letter, however, Mr. Lowry does not state that "FDS would . . . 
cease using Thomas's name and leads." (C.f. Ruling at 12.) In the July 19, 2002, 
letter Mr. Lowry does state that "We [FDS] are no longer selling any more Ted 
Thomas product effective today." (Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's. 
Memorandum").) As stated in Paragraph 2.c. above, in order for this 
representation to support or satisfy the requirements of a misrepresentation of a 
presently existing material fact, the statement would have had to have been made 
with an intention on Mr. Lowry's part that FDS would not cease selling the Ted 
Thomas product. As to this latter statement, Defendant Lowry states in his 
declaration that he believed that his representation was true when he made i t 
(Lowry Decl. at Para. 15-16.) Mr. Neubauer who was FDS's Chief Operating 
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Officer and Chief Financial Officer at the time states in his declaration that he had 
received instructions from Mr. Lowry to cease selling Plaintiffs product effective 
July 19, 2002. (Neubauer Decl. at Paras. 8,13-14; Lowry Decl. at Paras. 13-16) 
g. The only claimed evidence of "no presently existing intent to perform" is 
the argument put forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum that Mr. Lowry hid evidence of 
sales of Ted Thomas product after the July 19th letter. (Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs 
Memorandum") at p. 12). This allegation is made in Plaintiffs Memorandum, but 
is not supported by any submission. On the other hand, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Lowry never rescinded this instruction not to sell Ted Thomas products. 
(Neubauer Decl. at. Para. 10.) 
h. The only remaining argument that Plaintiff makes in support of its 
argument that a misrepresentation occurred is that by sending the July 19, 2002 
letter, Mr. Lowry intended to terminate the contract and by terminating the 
contract he was in effect representing what FDS would do upon termination, as 
stated in the contract between the parties. The Court rejects this argument and 
finds that Plaintiff has submitted nothing that would directly or by implication 
refute Defendant's submissions which contained sworn statements that he folly 
intended that FDS would cease selling Ted Thomas products when he sent his 
letter of July 19, 2002. The Court concludes that the July 19, 2002 letter does not 
constitute a current representation that the termination terms would all be 
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complied with and does not satisfy the element that there be a misrepresentation 
of a currently existing material fact. 
3. Defendant Lowry also argues that he is entitled to Summary Judgment on the 
ground that Amended Complaint fails to plead the essential elements of fraud. In this regard the 
Court finds and concludes that: 
a. The Amended Complaint makes no allegation that, and no submission is 
offered by Plaintiff that, would support a finding that Plaintiff was induced to rely 
upon the alleged misrepresentation. This is particularly important because given 
the nature and content of the alleged misrepresentation as well as the 
circumstances under which it was alleged to have been made it is difficult to 
imagine how reliance could have been induced. Thus, the context in which the 
alleged misrepresentation was allegedly made does not either infer reliance or 
allow for a finding of implied reliance. Utah courts hold that "mere conclusory 
allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding 
facts, are insufficient to preclude...summary judgment." Franco v. Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, \ 36, 21 P.3d 198. In the instant 
case, Plaintiff has failed both to allege induced reliance and failed to offer 
evidence by submission that would support a finding of induced reliance. 
b. Similarly, and for the same reasons set forth above in Para. 3.a above, the 
Court finds and concludes that the Amended Complaint fails to contain 
allegations, and Plaintiff fails to otherwise support the necessary element that its 
reliance on the representation was reasonable. 
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c. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege the essential element of damages. 
Paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint contains the allegation that "Defendants' 
fraudulent conduct has injured Plaintiff in an amount no less that $100,000 by 
withholding from [Plaintiff] its contractual percent of compensation, by ruining 
[Plaintiffs] reputation and relationship with its clients, by continuing to use 
[Plaintiffs] name, Product, leads, etc., by continuing to associate itself with 
[Plaintiff] and Thomas, and in other ways." This allegation of damages, however, 
does not describe damages of the type and nature that one could infer would flow 
from the alleged fraudulent representation here. On the contrary, the referenced 
damages appear to be contract damages or damages related to some other cause of 
action. Again the decision in the Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, is applicable: "mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude...summary 
judgment." 2001 UT 25 at % 36 
4. All of the foregoing must be examined in light of the burden of proof that a fraud 
claimant faces. "As a general rule, fraud is not presinned. When it is alleged, each element of 
fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.'5 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit, 
Section 471. "For the evidence to be clear and convincing, it must at least have reached the point 
where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion based 
upon the evidence." (MUJI 2.19.) In other words, as to the burden to show induced reliance, i.e„ 
that the Defendant made the representation for the purpose of causing the plaintiff to take some 
action, or causing the Plaintiff not to act, Plaintiff would have to show that there is no substantial 
doubt as to the truth or correctness of the allegation of induced reliance. The Court finds and 
concludes that based upon the parties' submissions to the Court that reasonable minds could not 
reasonably conclude that Plaintiff would be able to establish any of the elements of fraud in this 
case by clear and convincing evidence. 
5. For the foregoing reasons and the additional reasons set forth in Defendant's 
Memoranda, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for complete Summary Judgment is 
hereby granted in favor of Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry on the Third Cause of Action of the 
Amended Complaint; the Court hereby modifies and amends any previously entered judgment or 
ruling herein which is inconsistent with the findings and conclusions hereinabove; and, 
Defendant Jonathan Lowry is awarded his costs. ^ 
DATED this © S l a y of S o m b e r , 2008 
APPROVED AS TO F O R M : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
SteMien Quesenberfy 
Jessica Griffin Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080904-CA 
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2010 UT App 113 
Fourth District, American Fork Department, 050100038 
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The Honorable David N. Mortensen 
Attorneys: Stephen Quesenberry and Jessica Griffin Anderson, 
Provo, for Appellant 
Earl Jay Peck and R. Christopher Preston, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood.1 
ORME, Judge: 
%1 Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (J&T) appeals the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants 
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 Lowry and Kinsella created and were the sole shareholders, 
officers, and directors of defendant Financial Development 
1
 Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela T. Greenwood heard this 
case as regular members of the Utah Court of Appeals. They both 
retired from the court on January 1, 2010, before voting on this 
case and before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated 
herein as Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103(2) 
(2008); Sup. Ct. R. of Proff1 Practice 11-201(6). 
Services, Inc. (FDS), created in 1998 to provide sales and 
telemarketing services, and of defendant Esbex.com (Esbex), 
created in 2000 to fill the orders FDS received. In January 
2002, J&T and FDS entered into a Sales and Marketing Agreement 
(the Contract) whereby FDS marketed and sold, in exchange for 
commissions, certain courses developed by J&T.2 Defendant John 
Neubauer, the FDS employee responsible for its day-to-day 
operations, was the main contact with J&T and prepared the weekly 
reconciliation reports sent to J&T. 
%3 Due to recurring problems with FDS's payments to J&T and 
with J&T's product shipments, the relationship dissolved, 
culminating in FDS sending a letter, dated July 19, 2002, and 
signed by Lowry, purporting to cancel the Contract. J&T then 
filed a complaint alleging FDS breached the Contract and making 
other claims against FDS and its employees and officers. This 
appeal focuses solely on J&T's claims against Lowry and Kinsella, 
which included alter ego and a laundry list of torts: theft by 
conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, 
fraudulent nondisclosure, and intentional interference with 
business relations. The district court granted Lowry and 
Kinsella summary judgment, dismissing the claims against them and 
reserving only J&T's fraudulent misrepresentation claim as 
against Lowry. The court subsequently granted summary judgment 
in favor of Lowry on this claim as well. J&T now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%4 J&T asserts on appeal that disputed facts existed that 
should have precluded the district court from granting Lowry and 
Kinsella summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly entered 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
2These courses offered instruction on "how to buy tax lien 
certificates and engage in other similar activities to make 
money." 
3During the course of the litigation, both FDS and Esbex 
dissolved due to insolvency, and a default judgment was entered 
against them. The case against named defendant Jeremy Warburton 
was dismissed with prejudice. A previous appeal, filed before 
the second summary judgment order, was voluntarily dismissed, and 
the case was remitted to the district court. After entering the 
order granting Lowry summary judgment on the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim, the district court entered certification 
of finality pursuant to rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On appeal, "[w]e evaluate the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment," 
Doctors1 Co. v. Drezqa, 2009 UT 60, f 9, 218 P.3d 598, and 
"review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court," Raab v. 
Utah Rv. Co., 2009 UT 61, H 10, 221 P.3d 219. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Alter Ego 
^5 J&T argues that because genuine issues of material fact 
existed, the district court incorrectly granted Lowry and 
Kinsella summary judgment on J&T!s alter ego claims. 
Specifically, J&T asserts that "[alt]hough FDS and Esbex were 
struggling to meet their financial responsibilities, Lowry and 
Kinsella often took money from the corporations for their 
personal use" and that, "[s]tanding alone," this evidence creates 
a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. We 
disagree. 
1(6 To preclude summary judgment, a disputed fact must be 
material. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary 
judgment is allowed when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact") (emphasis added). The disputed fact recited by 
J&T is not material because even if it were true, it is not 
enough, by itself, to suggest applicability of the alter ego 
theory, especially in the absence of any facts bearing on the 
other elements and factors required to prove the alter ego 
4We note that our opinion considers J&T's argument as framed 
on appeal, that is, that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because disputed facts existed. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). J&T did not meaningfully argue here or to the district 
court that summary judgment was procedurally inappropriate, i.e., 
that the court improperly shifted the burden to J&T to 
prematurely prove its case, see generally Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, H 18, 177 P.3d 600, or that the court improperly refused a 
request to extend discovery under rule 56(f), see Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(f) (allowing a court, upon a partyfs adequate showing, to deny 
summary judgment or grant a continuance so additional depositions 
or discovery may be completed). Accordingly, we have no occasion 
to consider such questions on appeal. See State v. Robison, 2006 
UT 65, % 22, 147 P.3d 448 (stating that " [o]ther than for 
jurisdictional reasons [the court of appeals] should not normally 
search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a 
[district] court judgment") (alterations in original) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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theory. See generally Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 
596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979) (setting forth the requirements 
to prove alter ego). 
f7 The alter ego doctrine's first prong requires proof of 
"[s]uch a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a 
few individuals[.]" D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 
H 30, 147 P.3d 515 (first alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Norman, 596 P.2d at 
1030. "Significant factors" considered by courts "under the 
first prong are": 
"(1) undercapitalization of a one-man 
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate 
formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) 
siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant 
stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other 
officers or directors; (6) absence of 
corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) 
the use of the corporate entity in promoting 
injustice or fraud." 
D!Elia, 2006 UT App 416, % 30 (emphasis added) (quoting Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
1(8 J&T's argument focuses almost exclusively on the emphasized 
factor,5 "the use of the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant stockholder or stockholders." Id. Evidence that 
may establish this factor includes a "[f]ailure to distinguish 
between corporate and personal property, the use of corporate 
funds to pay personal expenses without proper accounting, and 
failure to maintain complete corporate and financial records[.]" 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 n.3 (emphasis added). 
5We note that J&T makes a conclusory reference to FDS and 
Esbex being "undercapitalized because of the actions of Lowry and 
Kinsella." Because this characterization lacks any record 
citation or argument related specifically to the requirements of 
undercapitalization, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 n.10 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (discussing undercapitalization), we assume this 
contention is closely related to J&T's claim that Lowry and 
Kinsella took money from FDS for their personal use and do not 
separately consider undercapitalization. 
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f9 Although J&T makes broad accusations that "Lowry and 
Kinsella . . . freely took money from the corporations' accounts 
without proper accounting," the evidence presented to the 
district court and called to our attention on appeal, viewed in 
the light most favorable to J&T, does not support the contention 
that the money was taken "without proper accounting." Id. Cf. 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 
25, H 36, 21 P.3d 198 ("[M]ere conclusory allegations . . . , 
unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are 
insufficient to preclude . . . summary judgment.") (second 
omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The evidence properly of record6 showed that although 
Lowry and Kinsella took money from FDS when it was struggling to 
meet its other financial obligations, the money was accounted 
for, and no evidence was produced that this accounting was done 
improperly. Cf. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416, Hf 28, 32, 34 (refusing 
to pierce the corporate veil when, inter alia, the court 
determined that although the owner received distributions, they 
"were not inappropriate"). 
KlO Even if we were to accept uncritically the accusations that 
the money taken was improperly accounted for or wrongly 
distributed and used for purely personal purposes, we do not 
agree with J&T's statement that "[s]tanding alone" this is enough 
to preclude summary judgment.7 Without any evidence of the other 
We note that some of the evidence referred to in J&T's 
brief derives solely from Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy 
deposition testimony and, as such, we do not consider that 
evidence. 
7J&T asserts that producing evidence on one of the eight 
factors evaluated in the first prong of alter ego analysis "is 
sufficient to raise a question of fact" that would preclude 
summary judgment. However, the cases J&T cited all analyzed more 
than a single factor to establish the alter ego doctrine's first 
prong--a point that J&T seems to concede by stating, with our 
emphasis, that "[c]ourts frequently disregard the corporate form 
where only a few of the [factors] are present in the case." See 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
43, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (determining summary judgment that 
dismissed an alter ego claim was inappropriate when the evidence 
showed that parent corporation owned 100% of subsidiary 
corporation's stock and "has paid some of its debts," that 
subsidiary was undercapitalized, and that subsidiary's "directors 
and officers d[id] not act independently of" parent corporation); 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 787-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(affirming a trial court's finding of alter ego when substantial 
(continued...) 
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alter ego factors, we cannot gauge the materiality of the one 
factor on which evidence was presented. Therefore, we conclude 
that summary judgment was appropriate because the evidence was 
insufficient to show a material dispute of fact relative to 
whether Lowry and Kinsella were alter egos of FDS or Esbex.8 
II. Torts 
fll J&T also argues that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on its various tort claims. Aside from 
liability premised on an alter ego theory, "an officer or 
director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of 
the corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by 
virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur personal 
liability by participating in the wrongful activity." D'Elia v. 
Rice Dey., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, H 38-39, 147 P.3d 515 
(emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
7
 (. . .continued) 
evidence showed corporate formalities were ignored; personal and 
business property was not kept separate; "officers and directors 
played little, if any, role in the operation of [the] corporate 
entities"; "there was an almost complete failure to keep and 
maintain corporate records"; and the corporate entities "were 
used as a facade for defendant's personal business operations"); 
Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) 
("Defendant operated the corporation as his alter ego, 
intermingling the corporate funds with those of his own. There 
were no corporate meetings, minutes or records regularly kept 
except a bank account. Defendant was not paid a salary by the 
corporation but used funds in the corporate account as if they 
were his own. He failed to deposit thousands of dollars in 
corporate cash receipts and used such cash as his personal 
funds."). 
8Because J&T fails to demonstrate a meaningfully factual 
dispute relevant to the first prong, we do not discuss the second 
prong, or "fairness requirement," of the alter ego doctrine, 
i.e., "if [unity of interest is] observed, the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an 
inequity." DfElia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, % 30, 147 
P.3d 515 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 
(Utah 1979). 
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A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
[^12 J&T asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate on its 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim because disputed material 
facts existed.9 The alleged misrepresentations occurred when 
FDS, having submitted its letter purporting to terminate the 
Contract and stating that FDS would no longer sell J&T's 
products, continued to sell J&Tfs products in violation of the 
Contract provision stating that FDS would cease selling the 
products upon the Contract's termination. However, J&T fails to 
persuade us that these statements were material misstatements of 
present fact, as is required to show fraud.10 See generally 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, 1 41, 56 P.3d 
524. When a party claims, as J&T does here, that the 
misrepresentations concerned a promise of future performance, the 
promise will only be treated as "concerning a presently existing 
material fact," id., if the party shows that when the promise was 
made it was "made with a present intent not to perform and made 
to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise," Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
fl3 Even if we were to accept that the evidence showed that 
sales were made after the Contract was terminated by the 
9As with its alter ego claim, see supra note 4, J&T focused 
its argument on the existence of disputed facts and not on 
summary judgment being procedurally inappropriate. Therefore, we 
limit our discussion to J&Tfs specific argument. 
10As summarized by our Supreme Court, "[t]o successfully 
establish a fraud claim, the party asserting fraud must show by 
clear and convincing evidence" 
(1) [t]hat a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to 
act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^ 41, 56 P.3d 524 
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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letter, no evidence was presented to suggest that at the time 
Lowry signed the Contract or sent the termination letter that he 
intended not to perform the promise to cease selling J&T products 
after termination of the Contract. To the contrary, evidence was 
presented by Lowry that showed he gave an instruction to 
Neubauer, which was never rescinded, to cease selling J&T's 
products. 
fl4 J&T also asserts that because two differemt judges decided 
summary judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
differently, it must be concluded that material facts existed.12 
We disagree. "[A] judge can change his or her mind any time up 
until the entry of final judgment, which is tirue even if the 
judge has taken over the case from another judge, . . . because 
. . . the two judges, while different persons, constitute a 
single judicial office [.]" State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, % 10, 
210 P.3d 955 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), 
cert, granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009). Therefore, we affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment on J&T's 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
B. J&T's Other Tort Claims 
fl5 As for J&T's contention that disputed material facts 
prevented summary judgment on its conversion claim,13 we conclude 
l:LJ&T's record citation supporting its contention that sales 
were made after the Contract's termination included 244 pages, 
part of which was Neubauer's stricken deposition. Our review of 
the evidence cited has revealed no evidence about sales being 
made after the Contract was cancelled on July 19, 2002. However, 
because the district court and the parties seem to have assumed 
that it had been established that sales were made after the 
termination of the Contract, we treat the issue on this basis. 
12We note that the first time the district court considered 
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, it determined that 
evidence existed showing "that FDS disregarded" the directive to 
cease selling J&T's products. However, FDS disregarding the 
directive does not make Lowry personally liable unless it can be 
shown that Lowry "participat[ed] in the wrongful activity," 
D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 1 38, 147 P.3d 515 
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
13To prove conversion, a party must establish "an act of 
willful interference with property, done without lawful 
justification, by which the person entitled to property is 
(continued...) 
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that the evidence relied on was not adequately supported by the 
record citations given or, even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to J&T, was misstated. For example, J&T claims that 
"Lowry and Kinsella repeatedly hid payments from J&T," but relies 
solely on Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy deposition testimony to 
support this statement. And, contrary to this statement, there 
was undisputed evidence that showed Neubauer--not Lowry or 
Kinsella--prepared the reconciliation reports that determined 
what J&T would be paid. Because the allegedly disputed facts 
were not supported by record evidence, the district court 
correctly granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment on J&Tfs 
conversion claim. 
1|16 The district court also correctly granted summary judgment 
on J&Tfs constructive fraud claim.14 Although J&T claims that a 
confidential relationship existed by virtue of the Contract, it 
did not demonstrate how the Contract created a confidential 
relationship nor did it point to evidence that J&T had "been 
induced to relax the care and vigilance [it] would ordinarily 
exercise," as would have been otherwise required to establish a 
confidential relationship based on the Contract. Wardlev Corp. 
v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 90 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). J&Tfs related fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim fails for a similar reason, i.e., no evidence 
was presented to support the proposition that Lowry and Kinsella 
had "a legal duty to communicate."15 Yazd v. Woodside Homes 
Corp., 2006 UT 47, % 35, 143 P.3d 283. 
(...continued) 
deprived of its use and possession," and that the party "is 
entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of 
the alleged conversion." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, H 31, 
155 P.3d 917 (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
14To establish constructive fraud, two elements must be 
shown: "(i) a confidential relationship between the parties; and 
(ii) a failure to disclose material facts." DfElia v. Rice Dev., 
Inc., 2006 UT App 416, \ 51, 147 P.3d 515 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
15
"The three elements of fraudulent concealment are . . . : 
(1) there is a legal duty to communicate information, (2) the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed information is material." 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 35, 143 P.3d 283. 
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Ul7 Finally, we affirm the district courtfs grant of summary 
judgment on J&T's claim of intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship.16 Once again, the evidence J&T 
references to support its claim is found in Neubauerrs stricken 
deposition testimony or is not supported by J&T's record 
citations. And even if the allegations were supported by 
evidence, they do not demonstrate an improper purpose or means, 
i.e., that Lowry and Kinsella*s "predominant purpose was to 
injure" J&T or that Lowry and Kinsella1s "means of interference 
were contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated 
an established standard of a trade or profession." Anderson Dev. 
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 20, 116 P.3d 323 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the district court 
also properly granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment on the 
claim of intentional interference with a contractual 
relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
fl8 J&T has failed to demonstrate that material facts were in 
dispute. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Lowry and Kinsella. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
119 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Senior Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
16To establish a claim for intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that ' (1) 
. . . the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintifffs 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff.1" Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, % 20, 116 
P.3d 323 (omission in original) (citation omitted). 
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